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Abstract
This work sheds light on how firm- and entrepreneur-specific attributes covari-
ate with Chinese private firms’ growth rates before and during the global financial 
crisis. In order to do so, we exploit the exceptional presence of data regarding the 
firms’ sales over the previous three years in the 2010 China Private Enterprises Sur-
vey. Firms run by entrepreneurs with a high level of education and a positive sub-
jective perception of their economic and social status tend to grow more in both 
periods. The age and the gender of the entrepreneurs, on the contrary, are not asso-
ciated with different growth performances. As shown in the literature, companies 
that are smaller, more productive and have higher capital at start-up perform bet-
ter in both periods. Notably, the relationship between firm growth rates and other 
relevant factors changes between 2007/2008 and 2008/2009: privatized companies 
outperform the others before the crisis, whereas joint-stock enterprises and compa-
nies with articulated systems of corporate governance do better in the crisis period. 
These and other novel results contribute to the understanding of the heterogeneous 
performances of the private firms in China and of the evolution of entrepreneurship 
during its transition toward a market-oriented economy.
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1 Introduction
Firm heterogeneity is a well-known feature of the economy, and firm growth vari-
ation is often discussed in the economic, management and business literature. As 
pointed out by Coad (2009), Coad and Holzl (2012) and Ipinnaiye et al. (2017), het-
erogeneity in firm growth can be accounted for by a number of factors: firm-specific 
features (e.g., corporate governance, age, size), firms’ strategies and decisions (e.g., 
innovation, export, investment, financing) and entrepreneurs’ traits (e.g., age, experi-
ence, beliefs, education, optimism). The impact of these factors, in turn, has been 
shown to vary considerably over the business cycle and in particular during and 
after economic crises (see, for instance, Cowling et al. 2015, 2018; Fort et al. 2013; 
Peric and Vitezic 2016; Saridakis 2012), most likely because the features that boost 
growth in good times are different from those needed to weather negative shocks. 
In the attempt to draw novel information about the development of China’s private 
firms in the face of the challenges posed by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
China Private Enterprises Survey (CPES) was modified in 2010 so as to gather 
information about the evolution of firm sales and profits over the crisis period, that 
is between 2007 and 2009. By exploiting this special feature of the 2010 wave of this 
well-known and representative survey for the first time, this work aims at improving 
our understanding of the heterogeneous impact of the GFC on the determinants of 
firm growth across Chinese private enterprises.
This paper contributes to the literature on heterogeneous firm growth in that it 
offers novel empirical evidence about how various firm- and entrepreneur-level fac-
tors determine the growth of the Chinese private sector around the GFC. China is 
interesting to study for at least two reasons. First, firm growth rates in China have 
always been very heterogeneous, even within industries and regional areas; second, 
the GFC considerably affected the Chinese economy, shifting its growth paradigm 
from an export-led model to a domestic demand-driven pattern (for a discussion, see 
Benini and Liping 2013; Bonatti and Fracasso 2010, 2013; Cai et al. 2010; Fan et al. 
2013; Lardy 2011; Wong 2011; Zheng et al. 2009).1 Understanding how the GFC 
affected Chinese private companies, however, is also relevant to those interested in 
economies in transition as, at the time of the crisis, China was rapidly progress-
ing in its transformation toward a market-oriented economy. Accordingly, our analy-
sis contributes to the limited research on the heterogeneous growth performances 
of private companies in economies in transition (see Botta 2020; He et  al. 2019; 
Kolasa et al. 2010; McMillan and Woodruff 2002, for a discussion). In particular, 
as entrepreneurship plays an important role in the process of structural change and 
innovation (Vivarelli 2013, 2016), China represents an interesting laboratory given 
the massive privatization spree that started in the early 2000s. While the CPES con-
tains information about firm-specific features, firms’ strategies and entrepreneurs’ 
1 This paradigm shift was reinforced by a gigantic stimulus package implemented by the authorities to 
support the economy. This package included an increase in government spending of 4 trillion RMB over 
2009 and 2010, in addition to very generous credit policies (see Bai et al. 2016; Cong et al. 2019; Wen 
and Wu 2019, for a discussion of the plan).
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traits, our empirical investigation addresses a number of relevant features of Chinese 
private companies that balance sheet data alone would not allow us to investigate 
(more on this below).
This analysis provides evidence confirming some previous findings, that is that 
firm size and productivity are, respectively, negatively and positively correlated with 
firm growth. Moreover, the company’s performance appears to increase with the 
level of education of the entrepreneur in both periods. We found that while the age 
and the gender of the entrepreneur are not correlated with firm growth rates within 
the two years we investigated, the companies whose entrepreneurs have a higher 
socioeconomic status did grow relatively quickly within the same period. Exporting 
firms grew less than the others in the second period, most probably because of the 
sharp contraction in external demand due to the GFC. On the contrary, in this diffi-
cult period of time, the companies investeing in knowledge accumulation did record 
better performances than the other firms.
The enterprises whose entrepreneurs served as the CEO grew more than the oth-
ers in 2008/2009, as did the companies with a board of directors and/or a board of 
shareholders. These findings suggest that the presence of an articulated system of 
corporate governance with a direct engagement of the entrepreneur at the top cre-
ated an advantage for enterprises during the GFC. Similarly, joint-stock companies 
(including almost all Sino-foreign joint venture companies at the time) exhibited 
higher growth rates than other Chinese private companies during the crisis period, 
whereas privatized companies expanded relatively more only in the year before the 
crisis. Our investigation reveals that private companies with more credit to start 
increased their sales relatively more during the GFC, probably because they ben-
efited from internal resources and continued to have preferential access to external 
financing from banks under the (indirect) control of the Chinese authorities.
This paper relates to various strands of literature on firm growth and entrepre-
neurship, and bridges them while providing novel empirical evidence on the Chi-
nese economy at the time of the GFC.
The first line of research this paper relates to are those works investigating the 
heterogeneous growth of Chinese companies. Most of the existing studies explore 
the issue by analyzing the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Production data-
base (see, among others, Bin et  al. 2020; Chen et  al. 2011; Guariglia et  al. 2011; 
Ding et al. 2016; Moschella et al. 2019; Yu et al. 2017). This is a survey covering 
State-owned companies and the private industrial firms with sales above 5 million 
RMB. Although rich in terms of information, this database provides no information 
on entrepreneurs’ characteristics or on small firms. Accordingly, the relationship 
between the entrepreneurs’ traits and the growth of their companies in China has 
not been explored using the Survey of Industrial Production database. To the best of 
our knowledge, only Elston et al. (2016) assess empirically the relationship between 
firm growth and entrepreneurs’ characteristics in China, but he exploits an ad hoc 
survey covering exclusively micro-firms (up to 30 employees) and involving only a 
few (260) private entrepreneurs located in only five cities in China. Accordingly, it 
is unclear whether his results are generalizable. As the CPES includes a representa-
tive sample of private companies spread across all Chinese provinces and all indus-
tries, our work makes it possible to draw more general conclusions on the impact of 
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entrepreneurs’ traits and companies’ characteristics on the growth of Chinese private 
firms.
A second line of research that this work relates to regards the study of entre-
preneurship in China. While there are plenty of contributions on the evolution of 
entrepreneurship in the country,2 analysis on the relationship between entrepre-
neurs’ characteristics and firm growth is still limited. Among the articles focusing 
on China, Djankov et  al. (2006) offer one of the first small-sample (seven cities, 
three provinces) analyses on the individual characteristics of the Chinese entrepre-
neurs, Yueh (2009) investigates the traits of self-employed entrepreneurs in urban 
areas, and Zheng and Zhao (2017) study the determinants of local clusters of entre-
preneurship in China. As anticipated, none of these works explore how Chinese 
firms’ growth rates vary with the entrepreneurs’ traits. This is a promising avenue 
of research because several contributions have shown that different entrepreneurs’ 
attributes are associated with heterogeneity in business practices and in firms’ activ-
ities. According to Curtis (2016), for instance, the distribution of managerial tal-
ent determines the way Chinese private companies deal with constraints affecting 
(small) private firms. Liu et  al. (2014) show that the companies whose entrepre-
neurs have previous work experience in multinational firms outperform those run by 
entrepreneurs without such experience. Marquis and Qiao (2020) find evidence that 
a founder’s communist ideological imprinting influences the company’s internation-
alization strategies, whereas Lu and Wu (2020) show that an entrepreneur’s religious 
beliefs are associated with diverse networking strategies. Finally, the importance 
of the entrepreneurs’ political affiliation and connections is discussed at length by 
Dong et al. (2016), Guo et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2008), and others.
Our study refers to a third branch of the literature showing that business cycle 
fluctuations and economic crises have a different impact on heterogeneous firms 
(Saridakis 2012). Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) suggest that the negative rela-
tionship between firm size and growth performance becomes stronger, in absolute 
value, during crisis times. Kolasa et al. (2010) show that various firm characteristics 
account for the heterogeneous response of Polish firms in the face of the GFC in 
2008/2009. Investigating the UK, Cowling et  al. (2015) find that only half of the 
SMEs experienced a serious fall in sales after the GFC, and Fort et al. (2013) show 
that young and small businesses tend to exhibit different cyclical dynamics with 
respect to the others, with the former suffering more during the GFC. Smallbone 
et  al. (2012), on the contrary, find that the performances of  the small companies 
in the UK and New Zealand are not significantly different in the aftermath of the 
economic crises. Focusing on the determinants that improve the firms’ capacity to 
weather a crisis, Peric and Vitezic (2016) conclude that firm growth was not sig-
nificantly related to companies’ size before the GFC, but it was positively corre-
lated with it during the crisis. Cowling et al. (2018) study the relationship between 
the entrepreneurs’ experience and the performance of their SMEs in the UK after 
2 Expanding on the seminal work by Ahlstrom and Ding (2014), He et al. (2019) and Cumming et al. 
(2016) summarize and discuss the findings contained in two special issues on the evolution of entrepre-
neurship in China.
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the GFC and show that previous experiences did not help them to weather a crisis. 
Unsurprisingly, there are several studies focusing on the relationship between firm 
financing, investment and survival during major crises. Among these, Cowling et al. 
(2012) find that the demand for external finance by SMEs in the UK tends to change 
when the economy enters a recession. Lin and Chou (2015) show that the source 
of financing for Chinese companies did considerably change after the GFC. Bartz 
and Winkler (2016) assess the relative growth performance of German firms dur-
ing the 2009 crisis and find that firm age exerts a different effect in normal times 
and in crisis periods, while firm size preserves a negative correlation with growth in 
both. Clarke et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between firm survival and the 
severity of financial constraints in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the GFC, 
while Iwasaki (2014) explores a large-scale enterprise survey to examine the sur-
vival of Russian industrial firms before and after the GFC. Joe et al. (2019) exam-
ine the performance of Korean owner-managers and employed managers during the 
Asian financial crisis and the GFC, and find that owner-managers over-perform due 
to their superior investment decisions. Investment patterns during the GFC crisis are 
analyzed by Campello et al. (2010), who find that problems were more serious for 
credit-constrained firms. By focusing on entrepreneurs’ traits and firms’ character-
istics around the GFC, our study bridges the research on the determinants of firm 
growth with the strand of the literature on the differentiated impact of economic 
crises and the business cycle fluctuations on firm performances.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theo-
retical background and the hypotheses (i.e., research questions) to test empirically, 
while Sect. 3 discusses the empirical framework. Section 4 provides information on 
the dataset and on the variables of interest, whereas the empirical findings are pre-
sented and discussed in Sect. 5. Section 6 is our conclusion.
2  Theoretical background
Several theoretical contributions in the fields of industrial economics, business, and 
management studies have shown that various characteristics of the firms along with 
entrepreneurs’ traits may potentially have an impact on the performance of the com-
panies. This work focuses on Chinese private companies in 2007–2009 to build on 
those insights and examines, first, what firm- and entrepreneur-specific covariates 
correlate with firm growth and, second, whether these relationships change with the 
onset of the GFC. In particular, we follow Ipinnaiye et al. (2017) and consider three 
groups of covariates that previous works found relevant to explain firm growth: 
firms’ characteristics, entrepreneurs’ traits, and firms’ strategies and decisions.
As for the characteristics of the firm that covariate with growth, one has to con-
sider firm size and firm age. Since the seminal work by Gibrat (1931), several stud-
ies have shown the existence of an inverse relationship between the initial size and 
the growth rate of the firm, and several explanations are compatible with this fact 
(Daunfeldt and Elert 2013; Neumark et al. 2011; Arkolakis et al. 2018). Companies 
that are more distant from the industry-specific “medium efficient size”, for instance, 
need to expand faster so as to rapidly close their efficiency gap. Moreover, in highly 
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competitive and innovative industries, where selection is tougher, the small-size 
firms that survive tend to exhibit higher growth rates. Firm age can affect the abil-
ity of a company to grow though various channels (Haltiwanger et al. 2013; Law-
less 2014), and Vivarelli (2013) and Coad (2018) illustrate several mechanisms such 
as: learning theories; accumulation of routines; liabilities of newness, senescence 
and obsolescence; routinization and reputation building. As suggested by Coad and 
Holzl (2012) and Coad (2018) in their surveys of the empirical literature, any empir-
ical analysis focusing on the covariates of firm growth has to consider both firm size 
and age simultaneously because these variables are correlated between them and 
negatively associated with firm growth. Moreover, size often operates as a mediating 
factor for the impact of age on firm performance.
Level of productivity is another interesting firm characteristic. Previous stud-
ies focusing on other countries have shown its relevance. Moreover, there is ample 
evidence in the literature that the progressive improvement in aggregate productiv-
ity in China was due to progress in allocative efficiency, which is associated with 
the faster growth of the more productive firms (Bin et al. 2018; Brandt et al. 2012; 
Chen et al. 2011; Curtis 2016). Furthermore, as shown by Guariglia et al. (2011), 
Moschella et al. (2019) and Yang and Tsou (2020), more productive firms in China 
tend to generate sufficient cash flow to finance investment and to grow at fast rates. 
To a certain extent, moreover, the level of productivity can be viewed as a proxy 
for the firm’s ability to exploit growth opportunities. The last reason to include the 
level of productivity in the analysis has to do with its indirect effect on growth: as 
explained by Barba Navaretti et al. (2014), productivity may be a factor leading to 
self-selection, and it has to be controlled for in the specification.
We believe that it is also important to control for the size and composition of 
capital at the establishment of an enterprise for two reasons. First, the financial 
dimension of the firm at its foundation is a determinant of its future growth when 
credit constraints are binding (Carpenter and Petersen 2002; Joeveer 2013; Musso 
and Schiavo 2008), as this is the case for small private firms in China (Hericourt and 
Poncet 2009; Moschella et al. 2019; Poncet et al. 2010).3 Access to external finance 
is important for firms’ post-entry growth in normal times and, as discussed at length 
in Introduction, some works have shown that the dependence on external financing 
may lead, in difficult times, to more severe constraints, larger underinvestment and, 
thus, slower growth. Second, as the size and composition of the financial resources 
provided by the entrepreneur may be correlated with his/her human capital and other 
individual characteristics (Cassar 2004; Colombo and Grilli 2010; Honjo 2021), the 
omission of a control for financial resources at the time of the establishment could 
affect the interpretation of the impact of the entrepreneur’s attributes.
Following the literature, we consider some aspects of corporate governance as 
well. The presence of boards of directors and shareholders, as well as the appoint-
ment of external managers in family-run firms, can impact the business strategies 
3 Private firms’ access to external credit in China has been limited because State-owned enterprises have 
traditionally received a preferential treatment by the financial institutions, due to their connections with 
the Chinese Communist Party.
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and, in particular, the ability of the company to adapt to the GFC. Similarly, as we 
focus on private companies in a country transiting toward a market-oriented econ-
omy, it is important to take a firm’s origin into account (Kung and Li 2007; Yusuf et 
al 2005; Song et al. 2011). Private companies that were previously State-owned or 
collectively owned enterprises may preserve business practices adopted before pri-
vatization and may therefore differ from new companies, foreign-owned firms and 
joint-stock enterprises (Chen et al. 2009). While we cannot differentiate among firms 
in terms of their ownership structure (as done for instance by Yang and Tsou 2020 
and Ding et al. 2016) because our sample contains exclusively private companies, by 
looking at the firms’ origin we aim to capture the role of past business practices and 
imprinting effects. The literature suggests that these aspects have been very impor-
tant in China, as well as in other economies in transition (Marquis and Qiao 2020; 
Mathias et al. 2015; Milanov and Fernhaber 2009). Notably, the origin and the cor-
porate governance of the firms may have different effects on their relative growth 
rates before and during the GFC because previous experiences and business prac-
tices may have different impacts in different economic conditions. Finally, we have 
to control for the fact that a few firms merged with other companies in 2008/2009, 
and their sales mechanically increased by a large extent due to the merge.
The main entrepreneur’s traits that need to be considered in the investigation of 
the determinants of firm growth have been pointed out by previous studies. The age, 
the level of education and the gender of the entrepreneurs can impact on entrepre-
neurs’ risk aversion, on their appraisal of external opportunities and on their ability 
to understand customers. These factors, in turn, influence firm growth. Barba Nav-
aretti et  al. (2014) find that higher firm growth rates are associated with younger 
CEOs. Gielnik et  al. (2012) conclude that the heterogeneous focus on opportuni-
ties is a mediating factor in the negative relationship between age and growth, and 
Gielnik et al. (2017) find systematic differences in firm performance associated with 
managers’ age. Education may impact on firm growth as well, as found, for instance, 
by Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000) and Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010) in 
their  analyses on African companies. Unger et  al. (2011) find a positive correla-
tion between education and success, even though the relationship is mediated by a 
number of firm- and environment-specific factors. The effect of education, however, 
appears to be less relevant in developed countries because technical and industry-
specific knowledge is typically more important in advanced countries.4 Fairlie and 
Robb (2009) discuss various reasons why gender is persistently correlated with dif-
ferences in business success and firm growth. As noted by Lee and Marvel (2014), 
however, gender often fails to be a significant determinant of performance once firm 
resources, perceived support from the ecosystem, and other context-specific charac-
teristics and mediating factors are controlled for.5
Various individual personality traits (such as personal motivation, proactiv-
ity, agreeableness, self-efficacy, emotional stability and fear of failure) have the 
4 We refer to Marvel et al. (2016) for a review of the literature on human capital and entrepreneurship.
5 Poggesi et al. (2016) offer a recent review of the literature on entrepreneurship and gender.
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potential to influence entrepreneurial decisions, such as entry and exit (Caliendo 
et al. 2014; Frank et al. 2007; Rauch and Frese 2007), and venture growth (Baum 
and Locke 2004; Miao et al. 2017; Kerr et al. 2017; Zhao et al. 2010).6 In this arti-
cle we analyze the entrepreneur’s evaluation of her socioeconomic status by looking 
at a few CPES questions explored by Chen and Zhang (2017) and Liu et al. (2021): 
perceived status can be used either as a proxy of reputation, associated with greater 
external trustworthiness in business, or as a proxy of self-esteem and optimism that 
tend to be positively correlated with risk taking (Hirshleifer et al. 2012; Zhang and 
Cueto 2017).7 Another reason to consider status in the estimation is that entrepre-
neurs with high status tend to attract more valuable people in the firm, and moti-
vate them better. The well-established moderating role of environmental factors on 
entrepreneurship (see, for instance, Boudreaux et al. 2019; Wennberg et al. 2013) is 
particularly relevant for China, where the transition toward a market-oriented econ-
omy has been associated with a positive transformation of the public perception of 
private entrepreneurs (Chen and Zhang 2017). For all these reasons, companies run 
by entrepreneurs with a high social status may exhibit better firm performances. Our 
analysis contributes to the literature in that no previous work has assessed the role 
that the perceived socioeconomic status of the entrepreneur has on the performance 
of private firms in China. It is more generally interesting because, as pointed out by 
Kerr et al. (2017), self-esteem is one of those personal traits for which the research 
is still limited also outside China.
Finally, firms may exhibit different growth trajectories because of specific busi-
ness cultures and operating strategies, and this has to be taken into account, as sug-
gested by Ipinnaiye et  al. (2017). Available empirical evidence indicates that the 
internationalized firms tend to grow faster than the others (Grazzi and Moschella 
2018; Sousa et al. 2012; Yang and Tsou 2020), often thanks to the process of learn-
ing-by-exporting. This is true also in China before the GFC, and Yang and Tsou 
(2020) show that export premia enhanced growth in companies of all sizes and ages. 
However, less is known about the crisis period, even though aggregate data suggest 
that export status fails to be associated with higher growth performances. Finally, 
the literature has shown that the accumulation of knowledge through Research and 
Development (R&D) investment and workers’ training may help firms’ expansion, 
but the evidence on this relationship is not conclusive (Capasso et al. 2015; Di Cin-
tio et al. 2017; Coad and Rao 2008; Deschryvere 2014; Freel 2000; Freel and Rob-
son 2004; Geroski and Machin 1992; Hölzl 2009). Hence, in this work, we exploit 
the CPES data to investigate whether the firms that engaged in such activities during 
the GFC grew more than those that did not.
6 The works in this strand of the literature stem from the upper echelons theory by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984).
7 We refer to George et al. (2016) for an overview of the role of reputation and status in management.
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3  Empirical specification
To address the question of how firm growth covariates with firms’ and entrepre-
neurs’ characteristics before and during the GFC, we apply the empirical model 
commonly used in the literature on firm growth. The covariates that we introduce 
in our specification follow the theoretical considerations illustrated in the previous 
Section and depend also on the questions available in the CPES that we can use to 
build proxies of the relevant concepts.
In general, thus, our empirical specification looks as follows:
where the annual percentage growth rate for firm f ( growthf  ) depends on unobserved 
effects at the provincial and industry level (respectively, p and i ), as well as a num-
ber of covariates (more in the following Section) that can capture firm characteris-
tics and strategies ( f  ) and entrepreneur’s traits ( e).
As we discuss in Sect. 4, in the 2010 wave of the CPES, the entrepreneurs were 
asked about the sales, profits and taxes of their companies for the years 2007, 2008 
and 2009. They were also asked to answer other questions about themselves and 
their companies at one point in time (e.g., at the establishment, in 2009, ...). The 
structure of the questionnaire allows us to calculate two growth rates (2007/2008 
and 2008/2009) for each company in the sample, but we cannot build a panel data-
set because for all the other variables there is only one observation. It follows that, 
in considering the structure of the dataset and the possible existence of a structural 
break around the GFC, it makes sense to run two cross-sectional regressions: one 
explores the determinants of the heterogeneous growth rates observed between 2007 
and 2008, and the other looks at the data between 2008 and 2009.
We introduce the industry and provincial effects ( i and p ) to control for the 
unobserved idiosyncratic factors that Poncet et al. (2010) and Shi and Wu (2017), 
among others, have shown to be important to explain the performance of Chinese 
firms. The literature has found evidence of the existence of a relationship between 
the uneven spatial distribution of entrepreneurship and the dispersion of various 
local factors (Elston and Weidinger 2019; He et  al. 2019; Yang and Tsou 2020; 
Zhu et al. 2019).8 Either random or fixed effects could be used to account for this 
kind of unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed effects estimator ensures unbiased esti-
mates, but this comes at the cost of renouncing to analyze industrial and provin-
cial variables.9 Hence, we adopt a statistical methodology to select between alterna-
tive specifications and perform the Hausman test for the growth rates in 2007/2008 
(1)growthf ,t =f + e + p + i + f ,t
8 Notably, similar considerations are valid for other countries too, as shown by Barbosa and Eiriz (2011).
9 Different research questions need different specifications. For instance, Ge et al. (2017) are interested 
in the effects of the local environment on the entrepreneurs’ political connections, and they can include 
only industry fixed effects because they need to encompass a number of regional variables in the empiri-
cal specification. Ma et al. (2015) explore the impact of both industry- and regional-related variables on 
the firms’ decision to become members of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce; thus, 
they cannot incorporate any fixed effects.
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and in 2008/2009. As the data reject the null hypothesis with the random effects 
model, we opt for including both industry and provincial fixed effects, in line with 
previous studies in the literature (among those using a single wave of the CPES, we 
recall Degryse et  al. 2016).10 As anticipated above, this specification prevents us 
from exploring the role of industry- and location-specific conditions, such as those 
associated with the Chinese stimulus plan after the emergence of the GFC or with 
agglomeration economies and spillovers effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects 
is necessary, however, to prevent that unobserved heterogeneity at the industry 
and provincial level might bias the estimates of the firm- and entrepreneur-specific 
parameters of interest.
Before describing the variables that we use to explore the theoretical aspects dis-
cussed in Sect. 2, we shall introduce the CPES and the peculiar characteristics of its 
2010 wave that are exploited, for the first time, in our analysis.
4  The survey and the variables of interest
4.1  The China Private Enterprises Survey
The China Private Enterprises Survey, built through face-to-face interviews with 
Chinese entrepreneurs, is based on questionnaires and sampling schemes designed 
by a research team made of economists and sociologists from the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences and several Chinese universities.11
Two important features distinguish this from other surveys providing microdata 
on the development of Chinese private enterprises and their entrepreneurs. First, it 
is one of the longest-running large-scale (nationwide and stratified) surveys of pri-
vate enterprises in China, having started in the mid-1990s and repeating regularly 
every other year. Second, to ensure that it remains representative of the population 
of registered private firms at the national level, the entrepreneurs are resampled sys-
tematically at each wave through a multi-stage stratified random sampling proce-
dure, including stratifications on location, industry, stage of economic development 
and distribution in urban and rural areas within each location (city/county).12 While 
larger datasets like the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Production database 
contain exclusively balance sheet data for relatively large firms, the CPES considers 
also entrepreneurs’ characteristics and includes companies of any size.
10 The details of the tests are available upon request.
11 The CPES has been conducted by the Privately Owned Enterprises Research Project Team that 
includes the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the State Administration for Market Regu-
lation, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Society of Private Economy, and the United 
Front Work Department of the CCP. Although strongly supported by the authorities, the data collection 
is not part of a government survey, and this reduces concerns of under-reporting for fiscal reasons.
12 Notably, the CPES’ original sample frame was a modified version of the official frame used by the 
China State Bureau of Statistics for its annual data collection. More information on the characteristics of 
the sampling procedures and on the various waves of the Survey is provided by Chen et al. (2019), who 
illustrate the wide use of the Survey among Chinese and international scholars.
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Because of CPES’ unique features, various waves have been analyzed by several 
scholars interested in investigating entrepreneurs and private companies in China. 
Among the cross-sectional studies using a single wave of the Survey13, we recall 
contributions by Chong et  al. (2013), Degryse et  al. (2016), Du et  al. (2015), Ge 
et  al. (2017), Lu and Tao (2009), Lu and Wu (2020), Ma et  al. (2015) and Zhao 
and Lu (2016). Degryse et  al. (2016) assess the impact of formal and informal 
finance on firm growth by exploring the 2006 wave; the same wave is studied also 
by Chong et al. (2013) who investigate the relationship between local concentration 
of banks and firms’ financing constraints. Using the 2010 wave, Lu and Wu (2020) 
explore the impact of the entrepreneurs’ religious beliefs on their activities, and Ma 
et al. (2015) assess whether Chinese entrepreneurs in 2012 benefited from joining 
the government-controlled business association to obtain formal political identity. 
Analyzing the 2002 wave of CPES, Lu and Tao (2009) show that weaker contract 
enforcement in China was associated with a higher degree of family control of busi-
ness. Multiple waves, pooled into repeated cross sections, have been investigated 
by Chen and Zhang (2017), Guo et al. (2014), Li et al. (2008) and Zhou (2013), in 
order to understand the implications of the entrepreneurs’ political connections on 
the activities of their companies.14
The 2010 wave of the CPES differs from the other waves in that the respond-
ents were asked to provide information on the sales (as well as profits and taxes) 
recorded by the company in the three (rather than the usual two) years before the 
survey (namely, 2007, 2008 and 2009). This feature of the 2010 questionnaire was 
added in order to learn about the performance of the private companies during the 
GFC, and it allows us to calculate two annual growth rates (one for 2007/2008 and 
one for 2008/2009) for each company that remained active between 2007 and 2010. 
All the other questions in the Survey refer to one period only, typically either at the 
time of the establishment (e.g., capital provided, previous legal status) or for the 
year 2009 (e.g., exporting status, levies and expenses paid, investment in pollution 
control, participation in a merger). Similarly, all the questions about the entrepre-
neurs’ traits regard either their past (e.g., education, work experience) or the pre-
vious year (e.g., self-perception, affiliation to the Chinese Communist Party). This 
setup makes it impossible to build a longitudinal and representative panel dataset 
with the CPES data, but the availability of two growth rates per entrepreneur-firm 
allows us to track the companies in the years around the GFC by means of two 
cross-sectional estimations.
As mentioned above, a number of scholars have pooled various cross sections 
of the CPES to investigate a number of research questions. This pooling approach 
would have been unwarranted in our case. First, it would have forced us to use infor-
mation for a timeline far from the height of the GFC. Second, it would have raised 
13 According to Chen et  al. (2019), from 1993 to 2016, 147 works adopted one year’s cross-sectional 
data from CPES, accounting for 70% of the total works using the Survey.
14 Liu et al. (2014) pool the 2000, 2002 and 2004 waves to analyze the impact of the entrepreneurs’ work 
experience in multinational companies on the return-on-equity of the private firms in which they oper-
ated at the time of the interview. Liu et al. (2021) explore how firms’ CSR practices covariate with the 
social status of their entrepreneurs.
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the problem of distinguishing the impact of sampling issues (as the firms in the sam-
ple change from wave to wave) from the actual variation in the way the covariates of 
interest affect firm growth. Third, pooling various CPES waves to study the impact 
of the GFC would have been controversial: the possible presence of a structural 
break is exactly why we expect that the correlation between the covariates and the 
growth rates changes over time.
The 2010 edition of the CPES involves more than 4500 firm-entrepreneur dyads 
located in 158 cities across all the 31 Chinese provinces. This covers about 0.1% 
of all the private firms in China across 15 industries. Notably, the sample does not 
account only for the medium- and large-sized companies, but it includes also house-
hold enterprises and small firms. Our analysis is conducted on a slightly smaller 
sample of companies that we obtained after a careful selection of respondents. More 
precisely, we discarded information for the entrepreneurs who did not provide inter-
nally consistent answers (i.e., whose qualitative assessments—in particular regard-
ing the direction of change of certain variables—were at odds with the quantitative 
answers given to other questions). We also eliminated those firm-entrepreneur dyads 
for which the data were not available in every year of interest. This refinement of 
the sample leads to a 10% reduction in the number of units, but all provinces and 
economic sectors continue to be covered in the restricted sample, which consists of 
3697 firm-entrepreneur dyads. The summary statistics of the variables used in this 
work on this sample, illustrated in next Sect. 4.2, can be found in Table 1.
4.2  Variables of interest
To address the question of how firm growth covariates with firms’ and entrepre-
neurs’ characteristics around the GFC, we calculated the annual percentage growth 
rate (growth) for the firms as the log difference of the sales between two consecutive 
years:
where Salesi,t stays for the nominal sales (in million Yuan) of firm i at time t, where 
t is 2008 in the pre-GFC period and 2009 in the second period. In order to avoid that 
the results are driven by outliers, we winsorized the top and bottom 1% of the distri-
bution of the growth rates. In the literature, firm size and firm growth are measured 
alternatively in terms of sales, employment or assets. While these proxies are not 
identical and choosing one has inevitable implications on the interpretation of the 
empirical results, our reference to firm sales is driven by the lack of data on employ-
ment and assets in the years 2007 and 2008. As mentioned before, the 2010 wave of 
the CPES gathered information on the three years before the survey only for a very 
limited number of firm characteristics (i.e., sales, taxes and profits).
Model (1) provides for the growth of firm sales to be a function of several covari-
ates. The matrices f  and e include correlates spanning the features of the firms 
and the personal traits of the entrepreneurs. We chose what covariates to include in 
f  and e based on theoretical motivations and on the empirical evidence discussed 
(2)growthit = ln Salesi,t − ln Salesi,t−1
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in Sect. 2. These variables also reflect the availability of information in the Survey 
that is suitable for building valid proxies of the concepts of interest.
In what follows, we present the covariates by starting with the firm-specific vari-
ables that will enter our baseline specification (3), used in the regressions for the 
years 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. The size of the firm at the beginning of the period 
of observation ( ln Sales2007 ) is introduced to control for the usual growth advantage 
of the smaller firms; we measured it in natural logs of nominal sales in 2007. The 
firm’s age (AgeFirm), that is the number of years since foundation (in logs), helps to 
capture the typically higher growth of firms at start-up and to limit the confounding 
effects between firm age and size. To include a measure of labor productivity, the 
variable LabProd is calculated as the logarithm of the ratio of sales over the employ-
ees in 2009, following Guariglia et al. (2011). Admittedly, a better measure of labor 
productivity would use output instead of sales and hours worked in place of employ-
ees; yet, as the CPES does not contain such information, we resorted to the closest 
available proxy. The financial dimension of the firm at its foundation (ln Capital 
at setup) is calculated as the logarithm of the initial capital (in million yuan). This 
accounts for one fundamental aspect of the capital structure of the private firms: the 
availability of resources.
The main attributes of the entrepreneurs in the baseline specification (3) are: the 
dummy variable Gender, taking value one when the entrepreneur is male and 0 oth-
erwise; the age of the entrepreneur, AgeEntrepreneur; the dummy variable HighEd-
ucation, taking value one when the entrepreneur achieved at least a Bachelor Degree 
and 0 otherwise.
Our baseline specification, thus, reads as follows:
where e, f refers to an entrepreneur-firm dyad. With the introduction of these corre-
lates, the sample is reduced further to 2737 valid observations for the two cross-sec-
tional regressions where the dependent variables are the growth rates in 2007/2008 
and in 2008/2009.
Subsequently, considering one additional variable at a time, we explore the impact 
of other firm characteristics that are potentially correlated with firm growth for the 
reasons illustrated in Sect. 2. First, we consider whether the company was a State-
owned or collectively owned company before becoming private, and the dummy 
Privatized takes value 1 if the enterprise stems from a privatization. We also verify 
whether the firm is a joint-stock company, and the dummy Joint − stock company 
takes value 1 if this is the case.15 We also control for the relevance of external credit 
in the firm’s capital at the time of the establishment ( Credit in setup funds , calcu-
lated as a ratio of external credit over total capital), as this can proxy for the ability 
(3)
growthf ,t = 1ln Salesf ,2007 + 2ln Capital at setupf + 3AgeFirmf+
+ 4Gendere,f + 5Higheducatione,f + 6AgeEntrepreneure,f+
+ p + i + f ,t.
15 The share of privatized companies in our sample of 2737 firms is 15%, equivalent to 423 companies. 
The share of joint-stock companies is similar as their number is equal to 441.
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of the firm to access external financing. To account for corporate governance, which 
is potentially associated with the control on the company and its performance, we 
encompass two dummy variables: the variable Board of directors , which takes value 
1 if the firm has a Board of Directors, and Board of shareholders , taking value 1 
if a Board of Shareholders is present.16 Finally, we control for the possibility that 
the enterprise underwent a merger in 2008–2009 (the dummy Merged in 2008 − 09 , 
taking value 1 if the private enterprise merged with others), as this could be mechan-
ically associated with higher growth rates when the operation is carried out.17
As suggested by Ipinnaiye et  al. (2017), the empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of firm growth could benefit from the introduction of covariates that capture 
aspects of the firms’ strategies. The features of the CPES questionnaire allow us to 
explore two aspects that, as discussed in Sect. 2, the literature has shown to be rel-
evant. These are export capacity and accumulation of knowledge. Hence, we created 
Table 1  Summary statistics over the entire sample
Summary statistics refer to the original sample once inconsistent respondents are eliminated
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Growth
08∕09
3697 22.44416 84.21538 −80.9524 666.1046
Growth
07∕08
3697 36.22620 126.7738 −76.0791 942.8571
ln Sales
2007
3697 6.510302 2.222293 0.405465 14.76606
ln Capital at setup 3095 5.172705 1.744897 0 10.96822
Age Firm (log) 3485 2.128239 0.497255 1.098612 3.258096
LabProd (log) 3601 2.818814 1.486687 −5.99147 11.33719
Gender 3686 0.856213 0.350922 0 1
High education 3630 0.896419 0.304759 0 1
Age Entrepreneur 3661 46.50423 8.515354 19 93
Privatized 3697 0.163917 0.370250 0 1
Joint-stock company 3697 0.159589 0.366274 0 1
Merged 2008–2009 3697 0.034893 0.183534 0 1
Credit in setup funds 3426 0.258027 0.437613 0 1
Board of Directors 3697 0.486611 0.499888 0 1
Board of Shareholders 3697 0.463890 0.498762 0 1
Export status 2009 3268 0.126989 0.333012 0 1
R&D exp status 2009 3252 0.406519 0.491259 0 1
Training status 2009 3498 0.696398 0.459879 0 1
Subsidies status 2009 3476 0.249137 0.432576 0 1
Entrepreneur CEO 3697 0.796051 0.402986 0 1
Perceived economic status 3535 5.373409 1.857631 1 10
Perceived social status 3535 5.383310 1.889687 1 10
16 The share of companies with either one of the two Boards is about 41%, whereas 29% of the firms 
have both Boards, and around 30% have none.
17 The number of mergers in the sample, e.g., 96, is relatively low.
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three dummy variables to capture the following situations in the year 2009. First, we 
look at whether the firm exported part of its production or not ( Export status 2009 ), 
as done for instance by Moschella et  al. (2019) and Kolasa et  al. (2010). Second, 
we explore whether the firm invested in R&D or not ( R&D exp status 2009 ). 
Third, we look at whether it organized training activities for its employees or not 
( Training status 2009 ). We also check whether there is a growth differential in 2009 
for the firms receiving State subsidies; for this, we introduce the dummy variable 
Subsidies status 2009 . This extension has to be considered as a rough check given 
that the Chinese stimulus plan consisted mainly of public investment and favora-
ble credit conditions, and not subsidies. Yet, it is appropriate to assess empirically 
whether there is any statistically significant difference in growth rates associated 
with the provision of State subsidies or not. Notably, these four variables can be 
used exclusively to investigate growth in the period 2008/2009, as the CPES does 
not provide information regarding the years 2007 and 2008. Given this, along with 
the fact that the introduction of these variables reduces the number of observations, 
we prefer to consider their inclusion as an extension. Moreover, as these variables 
risk being endogenous due to their timing, we distinguish them clearly from the 
baseline specification, and we interpret their estimated coefficients only in terms of 
statistical association with no reference to causation. The baseline specification is 
thus extended with the inclusion of firm-specific covariates (collected in the matrix 
f  ) for the growth rates between 2008 and 2009.
Finally, we produce a battery of regressions with a view to considering the pos-
sible impact of other entrepreneurs’ traits on the growth rates of their firms. First, as 
done by Bartz and Winkler (2016), we distinguish the firms where the entrepreneurs 
are the CEOs with the dummy variable CEOentrepreneur. Second, we consider the 
perceived economic and social status of the entrepreneur. Perceived socioeconomic 
status is an important individual dimension that might impact the selection of busi-
ness opportunities and practices, in terms of risk taking and the like. More precisely, 
as observed by Liu et al. (2021), the Survey asked the entrepreneurs to express what 
they think about their economic and social positions in relative terms. Perceived 
social status in China depends on the level of social respect and on reputation, 
whereas perceived economic status is mainly associated with income and wealth: 
thus, these two dimensions are similar (and their correlation is 0.8), but not iden-
tical. Accordingly, we build two categorical variables ( Perceived social status and 
Perceived economic status ) on the basis of the answers given by the respondents in 
rating their economic and social status on a 10-point Likert scale; they vary from 1 
(highest relative position) to 10 (lowest relative position).18 It is worth noticing that 
although the CPES does not allow us to build measures of self-efficacy (Bandura 
1997; Poon et al. 2006) or overoptimism (Cieslik et al. 2018), the subjective evalu-
ation of the entrepreneurs’ status is highly informative. For instance, as suggested 
by Koryak et al. (2015), perceived social status may act as a proxy for a measure of 
18 Only 5% of the respondents placed themselves in the highest and lowest positions, while half of them 
rated their status as between 5 and 6. This suggests that individual self-assessment can be considered, at 
least, reasonable.
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self-esteem. Judge and Bono (2001) show that self-esteem is an important driver of 
risk taking and of performance in business. Moreover, if the subjective social status 
evaluation mirrors the actual reputation of the entrepreneur in society, this variable 
can be associated with the entrepreneur’s ability to mobilize societal resources. This 
is most likely in a country like China where personal relations play a key role in 
business.
The baseline specification, extended to include additional covariates for firm-
specific ( f  ) and entrepreneur-specific ( e ) characteristics, therefore reads as 
follows:
Before presenting the results of the estimations, we introduce a few summary statis-
tics to provide a synthetic comparison of our data with the sample adopted by Elston 
et al. (2016), which is the most recent study about Chinese entrepreneurs and firm 
growth. The summary statistics of the firm- and entrepreneur-level characteristics, 
from the sample of 3697 firm-entrepreneur dyads whose responses are internally 
consistent, are reported in Table 1. Only 14% of the respondents in our sample are 
female, in line with the value 12.6% in Elston et al. (2016). The average and mean 
age in our sample are about 46 years, only slightly higher than the 40-year average 
value in Elston et al. (2016). Despite these similarities, the two datasets differ along 
a few dimensions. More than half of the firms in Elston et  al. 2016’ sample have 
between 2 and 5 employees, whereas more than half of the firm-entrepreneur dyads 
in our dataset refer to companies with more than 50 employees. This confirms that 
while the CPES covers all kinds of private companies, the survey used by Elston 
et al. (2016) and their analysis focus almost exclusively on micro-firms. The share 
of respondents who achieved a high level of education in our sample is around 10%, 
which is larger than the share in Elston et al. (2016); this difference can be related 
to their focus on micro-firms as well, because these latter are often run by less edu-
cated (self-made) entrepreneurs.
5  Empirical results
We ran two separate cross-sectional estimations for the firm growth rates in the 
period before the GFC (2007/2008) and during the crisis (2008/2009). As was men-
tioned above, a longitudinal analysis cannot be performed with the available data, 
and we are specifically interested in revealing the different effects that some covari-
ates might have exerted at the time of the crisis. Tables 2 and 3 report the estimation 
results for the growth rates of firm sales, respectively, in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009.
In the first part of each table, we introduce the estimated coefficients for the 
firm’s characteristics in the baseline specification (3). The analysis reveals that, in 
both periods, firm growth is negatively related to the level of sales at the beginning 
(4)
growthf ,t = 1ln Salesf ,2007 + 2ln Capital at setupf + 3AgeFirmf+
+ 4Gendere,f + 5Higheducatione,f + 6AgeEntrepreneure,f
+ f + e + p + i + f ,t.
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of the period, in line with what is shown in the literature. Smaller firms continue 
to exhibit relatively higher growth rates, in the attempt to close their distance from 
minimum efficient scale. The coefficient for this variable, however, is reduced by 
two-thirds in the second period, in line with what is also found by Kolasa et  al. 
(2010) for Polish firms during the GFC. This is possibly due to the fact that the GFC 
negatively affected firm growth rates across the board, but exerted a stronger impact 
on the smaller firms. As suggested by Peric and Vitezic (2016), larger firms manage 
to weather crises better than the small ones, and firms in China, where credit con-
straints and other frictions are more binding for the small private companies than in 
other countries, make no exception.
As to the estimated coefficient of ln Capital at setupf  , the analysis reveals that 
firm growth rates positively correlate with the size of capital at setup in both peri-
ods, consistently with the tenet that better capitalized start-ups do experience higher 
growth in the following years. This finding is in line with Huynh and Petrunia 
(2010), among others. The estimated coefficient is, however, smaller during the cri-
sis period. This can be explained with the fact that the GFC in China is associated 
with a fall in international demand and a credit crunch, which reduce the correlation 
between current growth and the level of capital at the time of establishment. More 
important, as we shall discuss, is the composition of such capital, at least to the 
extent that this proxies for the ability of the firm to obtain external financing when 
needed.
The age of the firm does not appear to affect its growth. Despite the fact that 
in 2007/2008 the sign of the coefficient is negative (as in Barba Navaretti et  al. 
2014; Degryse et al. 2016; Nunes et al. 2013, among others) and it turns positive in 
2008/2009, neither of the estimates is significantly different from zero. This finding 
might seem at odds with the conclusions reached by those studies showing that firm 
age negatively correlates with firm employment growth (see, for instance, Haltiwan-
ger et al. 2013; Lawless 2014). However, this result is in line with Bin et al. (2020), 
who find that firm age does correlate with employment growth, but not with sales 
growth in China. Indeed, heterogeneous developments in labor productivity may 
lead to divergent variations in sales and in employment.19 It is also important to 
recall that, as specified by Coad (2018), when size and age enter into the estimation, 
their coefficients capture only the direct, and not the overall, impact of these varia-
bles, as they are related. This implies that it is the direct effect of firm age on growth 
that is found insignificant, but one cannot rule out any indirect channels associated, 
for instance, with the mediating effect that age has on size.
Finally, consistent with theory and previous studies (Guariglia et  al. 2011; 
Moschella et al. 2019; Yang and Tsou 2020; Yu et al. 2017), the more productive 
companies tend to grow faster than the others. Importantly, the estimated impact in 
the two periods is similar. As argued in Sect. 2, it is possible that labor productiv-
ity captures some more general features of the company, namely, its greater growth 
19 The relationship between size, age and various measures of firm growth is complex and far from triv-
ial, as shown, for instance, by Audretsch et al. (2014), Coad et al. (2016), Coad (2018), Cowling et al. 
(2018) and Leoncini et al. (2019).
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Table 2  Firm growth covariates, pre-GFC—2007/2008
Independent variable: growth rate of sales  in 2007/2008. Covariates in baseline specification (1): firm 
sales in 2007 (logs), value of equity at birth (log), age of the firm (log), labor productivity in 2009 (sales 
over employees); entrepreneurs’ gender and high education dummies, age of entrepreneur. Results 
show the coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parenthesis): ∗ < 0.1 , ∗∗ < 0.05 , 
∗∗∗
< 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln Sales
2007
−29.44∗∗∗ −30.04∗∗∗ −29.56∗∗∗ −29.59∗∗∗ −30.64∗∗∗ −30.12∗∗∗ −29.75∗∗∗
(3.631) (3.732) (3.634) (3.650) (3.849) (3.730) (3.660)
ln Capital at 
setup
14.97∗∗∗ 14.71∗∗∗ 14.88∗∗∗ 14.99∗∗∗ 16.12∗∗∗ 14.64∗∗∗ 14.68∗∗∗
(2.263) (2.238) (2.252) (2.265) (2.425) (2.270) (2.224)
AgeFirm −9.359 −8.787 −9.608∗ −9.411 −7.459 −9.190 −8.734
(5.787) (5.826) (5.789) (5.784) (6.196) (5.791) (5.812)
LabProd 28.32∗∗∗ 28.86∗∗∗ 28.40∗∗∗ 28.46∗∗∗ 29.34∗∗∗ 28.69∗∗∗ 28.40∗∗∗
(3.880) (3.988) (3.883) (3.900) (4.056) (3.925) (3.882)
Gender 7.974 7.556 7.863 7.931 8.333 8.040 7.816
(6.450) (6.442) (6.439) (6.447) (6.710) (6.453) (6.442)
HighEducation 14.84∗∗ 14.91∗∗ 14.54∗∗ 14.74∗∗ 14.84∗∗ 13.98∗∗ 14.74∗∗
(7.047) (7.043) (7.048) (7.043) (7.248) (7.077) (7.046)
AgeEntrepreneur −0.0947 −0.174 −0.0861 −0.0832 −0.216 −0.133 −0.108























Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2737 2737 2737 2737 2570 2737 2737
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.113 0.111 0.111
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Table 3  Firm growth covariates, during GFC—2008/2009
Independent variable: growth rate of sales  in 2008/2009. Covariates in baseline specification (1): firm 
sales in 2007 (logs), value of equity at birth (log), age of the firm (log), labor productivity in 2009 (sales 
over employees); entrepreneurs’ gender and high education dummies, age of entrepreneur. Results 
show the coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parenthesis): ∗ < 0.1 , ∗∗ < 0.05 , 
∗∗∗
< 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln Sales
2007
−12.45∗∗∗ −12.63∗∗∗ −12.67∗∗∗ −12.66∗∗∗ −13.43∗∗∗ −13.33∗∗∗ −12.74∗∗∗
(1.733) (1.752) (1.741) (1.758) (1.822) (1.792) (1.744)
ln capital at 
setup
4.309∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗ 4.135∗∗∗ 4.337∗∗∗ 4.542∗∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗ 4.034∗∗∗
(1.229) (1.238) (1.222) (1.230) (1.254) (1.252) (1.228)
AgeFirm 1.053 1.229 0.575 0.981 0.152 1.272 1.645
(3.698) (3.709) (3.697) (3.692) (3.849) (3.686) (3.738)
LabProd 21.56∗∗∗ 21.73∗∗∗ 21.73∗∗∗ 21.76∗∗∗ 22.49∗∗∗ 22.04∗∗∗ 21.63∗∗∗
(2.576) (2.585) (2.573) (2.599) (2.685) (2.590) (2.578)
Gender 0.235 0.106 0.0225 0.176 0.213 0.320 0.0851
(4.742) (4.749) (4.720) (4.738) (4.895) (4.723) (4.735)
HighEducation 11.66∗∗∗ 11.68∗∗∗ 11.08∗∗∗ 11.52∗∗∗ 12.09∗∗∗ 10.54∗∗∗ 11.57∗∗∗
(4.095) (4.105) (4.077) (4.087) (4.171) (4.059) (4.097)
AgeEntrepreneur 0.0107 −0.0136 0.0272 0.0266 0.125 −0.0387 −0.00147























Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2737 2737 2737 2737 2570 2737 2737
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.098 0.100 0.099 0.102 0.101 0.100
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potential and its ability to effectively use available resources, both in good and bad 
times. For instance, Moschella et  al. (2019) find evidence that labor productivity 
relates to higher probabilities for Chinese firms to enjoy high-growth status.
The second part of the tables includes the estimated coefficients for the entrepre-
neurs’ attributes in the baseline specification (3). As found by Elston et al. (2016), 
the gender of the entrepreneur is immaterial for the performance of the firm.20 Dif-
ferently from Elston et  al. (2016), we found that companies with highly educated 
entrepreneurs score higher growth performances in both periods. The estimated 
coefficients in the two years preserve a similar dimension too. Our interpretation of 
this result is that educated entrepreneurs manage to adapt better to external condi-
tions, in line with Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000, 2010) and Gielnik et al. (2017). 
The entrepreneurs’ age, on the other hand, is not significantly associated with higher 
firm growth in either of the two periods, at variance with what found by Elston et al. 
(2016) for the micro-firms in China.21 As recently discussed by Zhao et al. (2021), 
since the entrepreneur’s age works as a synthetic proxy for a broad constellation 
of age-related factors that can be controlled for only partially in empirical studies, 
one has to interpret its correlation with (alternative measures of) firm performance 
with caution. Indeed, the relationship between entrepreneurs’ age and firm growth 
is still controversial: greater experience, better ability to recognise potential benefits 
from agglomeration (Zhang 2017) and networking (He et  al. 2019) can be offset 
by declining abilities and lower focus on opportunities (Gielnik et  al. 2017). The 
positive coefficient in the GFC period, although insignificant, is at least in line with 
the findings provided by Peric and Vitezic (2016), who found that the entrepreneurs 
with the highest human capital work in companies that perform better during reces-
sions. Finally, one could interpret the estimates together and tentatively conclude 
that, in China, the entrepreneurs’ education is a more important determinant of firm 
growth than his/her age because, in the early stages of the transition toward a mar-
ket-oriented economy, personal general education is less strongly correlated with 
experience and other business-related attributes than it is in other countries.
In Tables 2 and 3, we explore also how additional firm characteristics correlate 
with firm growth. For the reasons explained in Sect. 2, we consider the current and 
legal status of the company, as well as the presence of a board of directors and of a 
board of shareholders (or lack thereof). When investigating the determinant of the 
firm growth rates in 2007/2008, only two variables have statistically significant coef-
ficients; they are Privatized and Board of  shareholders. In normal times, thus, the 
Chinese companies that changed their status from State- and collectively owned to 
20 This is not necessarily the case in other countries. Although focusing on firm strategies rather than on 
firm growth, Buratti et al. (2018) show that male and female entrepreneurs reacted differently during the 
crisis period in Italy.
21 Two explanations for the divergence in these results are the non-negligible differences in the two data-
sets and the absence of various firm’s characteristics and fixed effects in Elston et al. (2016)’s empirical 
specifications. Moreover, while Elston et al. (2016) measure education with a categorical variable, tak-
ing values ranging from 1 to 7, we create a dichotomous variable by splitting the entrepreneurs between 
more educated (i.e., with at least a Bachelor degree) and less educated ones. These different ways to cap-
ture education may contribute to our contrasting results.
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privately owned tend to exhibit higher growth than the others. This result is in line 
with what is found by Yang and Tsou (2020), and it can be interpreted in two ways: 
one, this is the product of selection effects in the privatization process (due to pri-
vatization of the companies with better growth opportunities); two, it reflects the 
fact that privatized companies have continued to enjoy a privileged position among 
the private firms by preserving favorable access to scarce resources and public 
demand. When focusing on the GFC period, however, the coefficient for the vari-
able Privatized loses statistical significance. This suggests that the hypothesis that a 
privileged position during the GFC comes with pre-existing ties with the authorities 
is not supported by the data. On the contrary, it is the joint-stock companies that 
exhibit relatively stronger growth during the crisis. As several joint-stock companies 
are joint ventures involving foreign firms, it is likely that their faster growth rates are 
associated with the benefits stemming from international connections (i.e., knowl-
edge diffusion, intra-firm/group demand, intra-firm/group financing and the like). 
This accords well with the results in Kolasa et  al. (2010), who found that foreign 
ownership of Polish firms mitigated the contraction in sales during the GFC period. 
The presence of a board of directors and/or of a board of shareholders appears posi-
tively correlated with firm growth rates in both periods: the size of the coefficients 
is similar, even though their significance is higher in 2008/2009.22 It seems that 
a more developed structure of corporate governance did help the Chinese private 
companies to grow more, particularly during the crisis period. This is in line with 
He et al. (2015), who found a positive relationship between a firm’s efficiency and 
good corporate governance in China. All in all, these results seem to support the 
hypothesis that the growth of a Chinese private company also depends on the kind 
of experience, resources and business practices that it can draw upon either from its 
own past (or from its entrepreneur’s, as shown by Marquis and Qiao 2020; Mathias 
et al. 2015; Milanov and Fernhaber 2009) or from external sources (i.e., connected 
companies and members of boards). The relative importance of the different sources 
does vary a lot in normal times and in crisis periods. The relative importance of 
external credit in capital at the time of establishment is another covariate that posi-
tively correlates with firm growth only in the second period. Insofar as the share of 
external credit in total capital at the time of establishment is a proxy for the ability 
of the firm to obtain external financing, this variable may reflect the vantage position 
of those private companies that, during the credit crunch, could receive the financial 
resources needed to support their growth.
As suggested by Ipinnaiye et  al. (2017), our analysis would benefit from the 
introduction of covariates capturing relevant aspects of the firm’s strategy. In 
Table 4, we introduce three covariates capturing firms’ strategies in 2009: export-
ing ( Export status 2009 ), investment in R&D ( R&D exp status 2009 ) and training 
activities ( Training status 2009 ). As explained in Introduction and in Sect.  4, the 
literature suggests that these traits are associated with firm strategies conducive to 
22 In fact, the presence of a board of directors is not significant in 2007/2008. This confirms the Chinese 
tradition of treating boards of directors as not very important, due to the constraints posed on their moni-
toring capacity in normal times (Wei and Ling 2015).
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higher growth rates. As the CPES does not contain information on these aspects for 
years before 2009, we assess these variables only for the GFC period. As expected, 
investment in R&D and training activities appear to be associated with higher firm 
growth. This is in line with the idea that companies that expand faster are invest-
ing in knowledge accumulation (Capasso et al. 2015; Garcia-Manjon and Romero-
Merino 2012). Recent evidence provided by Zhu et al. (2021) suggests that this rela-
tionship is stable in time given that it has been detected also in the years following 
the GFC. The negative (insignificant) coefficient for exporting status that we found 
may seem counter-intuitive given the well-known extraordinary performance of the 
Chinese exporters. However, while Chinese exporting companies have grown more 
than purely domestic firms when the global demand was flourishing (Yang and Tsou 
2020), they were also the most directly exposed to trade collapse during the GFC.23 
Similar conclusions have been reached by Kolasa et al. (2010), who find that export-
oriented Polish firms suffered the most, in terms of sales growth, from the contrac-
tion in global demand brought about by the GFC. Furthermore, as a check, we show 
that access to State subsidies ( Subsidies status 2009 ) did not affect firm growth rates 
during the GFC. This finding is in line with the evidence that the Chinese authorities 
implemented a stimulus policy based on higher domestic demand and more abun-
dant credit, and not on firm subsidies. As the variables capturing firm strategies are 
measured in 2009, they might be endogenous. Omitted unobserved factors could 
affect both growth rates and firms’ strategies: the extent to which firms suffer finan-
cial constraints, for instance, may negatively impact both growth and the decision to 
invest in R&D. Short of internal instruments and longitudinal variation, we cannot 
fully address these concerns. For this reason, we interpret these findings with cau-
tion and in terms of correlations. 
The last set of results, reported in Table  5, includes various extensions of the 
specification (4) exploiting additional entrepreneur-level features. The first finding 
regards the role of the entrepreneur within the firm. We include a dummy variable 
CEOentrepreneur taking value 1 if the entrepreneur is also the CEO, and 0 other-
wise. This covariate turns out to be statistically significant only in the estimations 
for the growth rate of sales during the GFC, with and without the variables captur-
ing firm strategies.24 This result could be due to the fact that the direct engagement 
of the entrepreneur in the top management of the firm becomes important at the time 
of the crisis as he/she is in the position to align the firm’s activities with the new 
business opportunities emerging during the crisis. One alternative possibility is that 
the entrepreneur-CEO can extract higher returns from personal ties with the officials 
in charge of implementing the Chinese stimulus plan. An alternative interpretation 
is that, as suggested by Joe et al. (2019), owner-managers have a superior ability to 
identify and pursue investment opportunities, especially in a volatile and changing 
23 Moreover, exporting companies probably benefited less from the increase in domestic demand due to 
the stimulus package.
24 To make the results comparable across time, we reproduced the estimates both with and without the 
inclusion of the significant variables capturing the firm strategies (i.e., R&D and traineeship expendi-
tures) for the GFC period.
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Table 4  Firm growth covariates, during GFC—2008/2009, extension
Independent variable: growth rate of sales  in 2008/2009. Covariates regarding firm strategy in 2009: 
export status dummy, R&D expenditure status dummy, traineeship activities status dummy, subsidies 
recipient dummy. Results show the coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in paren-
thesis): ∗ < 0.1 , ∗∗ < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Sales
2007
−15.17*** −17.62*** −16.25*** −15.19*** −18.46***
(2.093) (2.020) (2.009) (2.003) (2.197)
ln capital at setup 3.620*** 4.737*** 4.037*** 3.894*** 5.049***
(1.383) (1.316) (1.281) (1.305) (1.379)
AgeFirm 0.951 0.562 0.0592 0.224 2.047
(4.052) (3.751) (3.881) (3.945) (3.903)
LabProd 24.28*** 25.34*** 23.62*** 23.56*** 25.40***
(2.905) (2.832) (2.771) (2.797) (2.987)
Gender −1.476 −1.420 −1.641 −0.681 −4.623
(5.262) (5.206) (4.981) (4.983) (5.458)
HighEucation 11.03** 13.49*** 9.683** 9.967** 13.13***
(4.550) (3.502) (4.261) (4.211) (3.701)
AgeEntrepreneur 0.0590 0.151 0.0790 0.0823 0.0592
(0.210) (0.220) (0.208) (0.209) (0.219)
Privatized 2.957 1.402 1.432 2.058 2.489
(5.447) (4.947) (5.359) (5.187) (5.314)
Joint-stock company 10.51* 10.39** 10.32** 11.62** 8.055
(5.377) (5.088) (5.148) (5.165) (5.156)
Merged in 2008–2009 14.23 17.70* 13.05 14.25 15.82
(11.27) (10.65) (10.22) (10.42) (11.49)
Credit in setup fund 6.936* 7.360* 5.516 7.218* 5.027
(4.200) (3.887) (3.925) (3.961) (4.077)
Board of directors 12.79*** 10.58*** 10.42*** 10.28*** 10.06**
(4.040) (3.896) (3.702) (3.814) (4.034)
Board of shareholders 7.045* 5.642 6.234* 7.117* 7.124*
(3.830) (3.711) (3.598) (3.696) (3.836)
Export status 09 −2.520 −3.739
(3.537) (3.749)
R&D exp status 09 11.60*** 8.402*
(3.659) (4.404)
Traineeship status 09 13.06*** 12.54***
(4.062) (4.641)
Subsidies stratus 09 4.814 3.042
(3.701) (4.030)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2348 2373 2498 2486 2182
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.126 0.112 0.107 0.126
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environment, such as a crisis. Interestingly, these results disagree with those in Bartz 
and Winkler (2016), who find that German firms whose director is the founder out-
performed the others in normal periods, but not during the GFC.
Finally, we explore the impact of the assessment that the entrepreneurs give of 
their own economic and social status on firm growth in the period 2008/2009. We 
expect a positive correlation between the entrepreneur’s subjective evaluation of the 
status and the firm’s performance for the various reasons discussed in Sect. 2. The 
estimates confirm that this is indeed the case. Given that the variables go from 1 
(highest relative position) to 10 (lowest relative position), negative coefficients are 
in line with our expectations of a positive relationship between perceived status 
and firm growth. As anticipated, there are multiple interpretations of these results. 
Assuming that the entrepreneur’s self-perception is correct, one way to interpret 
the estimates is that the qualities of the entrepreneur are, so to speak, transferred 
to the firm: for instance, entrepreneurs with high social status may have better con-
nections and enjoy greater credibility, and these traits may provide an advantage to 
their firms, especially in difficult periods such as a credit crunch. This reading of the 
impact of perceived social status is consistent with what was reported by Chen and 
Zhang (2017) on charitable giving, whereby the perceived status of entrepreneurs is 
connected with the giving behavior of their private companies. Similarly, Liu et al. 
(2021) show that Chinese entrepreneurs with high social status are more prone to 
make their firms engage in social responsibility efforts. If we assume that the subjec-
tive evaluation of status is a proxy for the entrepreneur’s self-esteem and optimism, 
our results could imply that companies run by optimistic and risk-loving entre-
preneurs tend to grow more in China, as also suggested by Cucculelli and Ermini 
(2013). Finally, it is possible to explain our findings in terms of assortative-match-
ing: the entrepreneurs working in successful companies may have rosier perceptions 
of their own status in the society, and firms with higher potential may attract entre-
preneurs with higher social status. This interpretation is particularly relevant for the 
perceived economic status. Notably, the inclusion of these variables does not signifi-
cantly modify the estimated coefficients for all the other individual features in the 
baseline specification.
6  Conclusions, limitations and policy implications
In this work we exploited the peculiar characteristics of the 2010 wave of the CPES 
to explore how firm- and entrepreneur-specific attributes covariate with Chinese 
private firms’ growth rates in the period 2007–2009. Building on a representative 
sample of entrepreneurs, we found novel results on the relationship between firm 
performance and various firms’ and entrepreneurs’ features, which we identified as 
potential drivers of firm growth in previous theoretical and empirical studies. We 
show that, as pointed out by Bartz and Winkler (2016) in a study on German firms 
during the GFC, “crisis times are associated with a rise in uncertainty where pat-
terns observed in normal times do not hold.” The relationship between some of the 
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covariates and the firm growth rates does also significantly change in China after the 
GFC.
Our estimations confirm a number of results from previous analyses, and, in par-
ticular, the usual relationships between firm size and productivity, on the one hand, 
and the growth rates, on the other. The companies with better access to external 
financing, moreover, seem to have performed better during the crisis period, in line 
with the evidence on the importance of credit constraints for small private compa-
nies in China. In contrast with works focusing on other countries, this analysis sug-
gests that the age of the company and the gender of the entrepreneur are immate-
rial for what concerns the performance of the firms in either period. Moreover, the 
estimates suggest that only the education of the entrepreneur positively influences 
the growth of the firm and to a similar extent in both periods. The age of the entre-
preneur, instead, does not seem a significant determinant of growth differentials. 
We interpret these results as suggestive of education over age, probably because 
age and previous experiences are not necessarily conducive to better entrepreneur-
ial outcomes in the early stages of the Chinese transition toward a market-oriented 
economy.
The creation of variables measuring the entrepreneurs’ perception of their eco-
nomic and social status allows us to find another a novel result: the companies run 
by the entrepreneurs with a high perceived economic and social status tend to grow 
more. While this may be due to assortative matching between firms and entrepre-
neurs, it is possible that the entrepreneur’s reputation represents a valuable intangi-
ble asset for the company. Different levels of self-esteem, moreover, may be asso-
ciated with different business practices, in turn conducive to diverse outcomes. 
Unsurprisingly, the firms where the entrepreneur/founder takes the role of CEO tend 
to grow more during the GFC, perhaps because this is exactly when personal con-
nections help to access scarce resources and increase domestic market shares. We 
also find the companies with a board of directors and/or a board of shareholders 
perform better during the crisis period, as do also the joint-stock companies. These 
results taken together suggest that private firms in China weathered the GFC better 
when they could count on articulated solutions of corporate governance (whereby 
more people could contribute to sharing information and connections), on closer ties 
with large international firms (that could smooth the impact of the crisis) and on 
well-educated, high status entrepreneurs who were fully engaged in the management 
of the companies.
As to the firms’ strategies, the Chinese private companies that engaged in 
knowledge accumulation appear to have outperformed the others during the crisis, 
whereas exporting companies suffered relatively more from the sharp collapse in 
global demand.
Finally, the performance of the private companies in China in this period appears 
to be influenced by whether or not the experiences, resources, organizational solu-
tions, strategies and business practices they could rely upon matched what was 
required, given the mutable economic conditions associated with the GFC. This 
finding strengthens our intuition that the entrepreneurs’ traits and the companies’ 
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characteristics contribute to explain the highly heterogeneous performance of the 
Chinese firms both in normal and in critical periods.
Admittedly, our analysis has several limitations. Notwithstanding the adoption 
of two cross-sections for the same sample of companies, the characteristics of the 
CPES prevent us from pooling waves of the survey and from carrying out a longitu-
dinal study.25 The inclusion of several firm-level covariates, the use of lagged values 
and the introduction of industry and provincial fixed effects limit the possible endo-
geneity problems associated with certain variables. Since the results of the baseline 
specification do not change when we introduce the covariates one at a time or simul-
taneously, omitted variable problems might be of limited relevance. Notwithstand-
ing, the cross-sectional nature of the CPES demands great caution in the interpreta-
tion of the estimates. This is, indeed, the reason why we discussed the results most 
often in terms of statistical associations rather than causal relationships between the 
covariates and the firm growth rates. Despite these limitations stemming from the 
cross-sectional nature of the CPES, it is important to stress that both the number 
of firms in the survey and the representativeness of the CPES sample are precious, 
and they allow us to draw evidence on firms and entrepreneurs in China that would 
otherwise not be available in other longitudinal dataset. The CPES, hence, remains 
a valuable source of information compared with other small and ad hoc surveys on 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics, as it guarantees a much wider coverage of Chinese 
cities and private firms of any size than other similar surveys.
A second limitation of our study regards the decision of delineating the variation 
between 2007 and 2008 as pre-GFC period and that between 2008 and 2009 as GFC 
period. This is an approximation because the GFC started in mid-September 2008, 
and it affected firms’ sales in the last quarter of 2008. Although this approximation 
has to be acknowledged for the sake of precision, it appears a conservative choice 
because the differences in the firms’ growth rates across the two periods would have 
been potentially larger, had the GFC started in January 2009. Detecting significant 
differences across the two periods, thus, is made more difficult by this approxima-
tion. For analogous reasons, a similar approach has been adopted also by other 
researchers interested in the impact of the GFC (see Lin and Chou 2015; Joe et al. 
2019; Cong et al. 2019; Kolasa et al. 2010, among others).
A third limitation is associated with the partial overlap between the GFC and the 
Chinese stimulus plan. Admittedly, due to the lack of firm-level information about 
the plan, we could not distinguish the relative impact of these two phenomena on the 
firms’ performances in the second period. We took this into account in the interpre-
tation of the results where possible.
Our analysis allows us to draw a few methodological suggestions. Our findings 
cast some doubt on the robustness of the results obtained by pooling cross-sectional 
25 It is worth recalling that pooling several waves would have not allowed us to address the change in the 
parameters around the GFC. The sample of entrepreneurs and firms involved in one CPES wave radically 
varies over the two consecutive surveys. This prevents us from performing a longitudinal analysis. Merg-
ing the CPES with the Chinese annual Survey of Industrial Production would not have been possible 
either, as the overlap between the samples of the two surveys is very limited.
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waves of the CPES, as is often done in the literature. Pooling waves increases the 
sample size and allows to exploit the variation of some variables over time, but it is 
not warranted in the presence of a structural break. In our analysis, this is relevant 
for the estimated impact of several, though not all, variables. In other words, pooling 
CPES waves is possible and useful, but some care is warranted in the presence of 
major economic disruptions.
To close, we would like to draw some policy implications from our analysis. 
The first implication regards the importance of appreciating the role that individual 
attributes play in shaping the performance of firms in normal and critical periods. 
This implies, for instance, that the authorities should continue to support the educa-
tion of entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurship of educated young people. Although 
the companies where the entrepreneurs are more involved in management perform 
better in difficult periods, so do those with a more sophisticated corporate model, 
whereby a number of different people may contribute to sharing information, to 
assessing the opportunity space and to activating social networks. Given that, as 
pointed out by Molnar et  al. (2017), there are no tight governance rules for non-
listed non-State firms in China that are free to have boards or not, some improve-
ments along this line may produce positive results.
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